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The practice of affmnative action, as I shall
understand it, comes to this: When two equally
qualified persons apply for a single position, and one
is a member of a suspect group (a woman or a
minority), then preference is and should be given to
the member of the suspect group. I want to offer an
intuitive, non-technical defense, of this practice. My
discussion shall be limited to the academic setting,
especially positions of instruction. I shall not be
talking about admission policies to undergraduate,
graduate, or professional schools. Persons entering
these schools enter to be taught rather than to teach.
Acccordingly, I think that the very issue of
affirmative action might not be applicable to
admission programs. Traditional criteria such as test
scores are one measure of a person's intellectual
ability (or her capacity to learn), but not the only one.
And there is no reason why academic institutions
should avoid applying both traditional and non-
traditional criteria of excellence for admitting students
to various programs and schools.
I shall not have anything to say about what the policy
should be when competition for a single position is
between two members of a different suspect group;
nor shall defend my belief that when the competition
is between a woman and a male member of a suspect
group, preference should be given to the woman. I
hold this view because I believe [as I have argued in
IISexism and Racism: Some Conceptual Difference, II
Ethics 90 (1980)] that sexism is more entrenched
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than racism. Sexual interest, and the sexism that is
generally characteristic of the male's self-conception
in this regard, considerably complicates matters for
women in a, way that is not normally the case for
men. For reasons offered in the conclusion of this
essay, I reject the role-model argument for
affirmative action. Finally, I shall for the sake of
simplicity generally confine my remarks to a single
suspect group, namely blacks.
I
Suppose that I cause $1000 worth of damage
to your car. Then I take it that lowe you that much
for repairs. This is so whether you ever intend to get
the car repaired or whether, on the one hand, you are
extremely rich and I, on the other, am extremely
poor. To be sure, if you are extremely rich and I am
extremely poor, it would be awfully kind of you to
waive this debt: but I certainly have no right to your
doing so. Now, suppose that one day you receive in
the mail a check from me for the amount of $1000
accompanied by a note. On the note you expect me
to say that the enclosed money is for the damage
which I did to your car; however, I tell you, instead,
that the money is a birthday gift. From that day on, I
treat you as if my debt with you has been settled.
That is, never again do I make mention of owing you
any money for the damage that I did to your car.
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Though you have in your possession the
amount of money that I owe you for damaging your
car, I take it to be clear that something has gone
wrong. For if the $1000 I gave you on your
birthday was, indeed, a birthday gift, then I still owe
you $1000 for repairs. If, instead, it was intended to
settle the debt that I owe you, then I really should say
as much and not present it to you as if it were a gift.
For I assume that the following is true: X's giving A
to Y can be construed as X's giving Y a gift if and
only if it is not the case that X's giving A to Y
constitutes a settling of a debt to Y, where it is
understood that the debt is something other than that
of reciprocating gifts.
ow, if I present the $1000 to you as a gift
when, in fact, I mean to settle thereby my debt to
you, then I dare say that I add insult to injury, as
here I am giving you the money it takes to repair the
damage without acknowledging that I am responsible
for the damage. I am acting as if you just so happen
to have found yourself with $1000 orth of damage
to your car (something fell on it or you were the
victim of a hit and run accident), and I am being
generous enough to give you the money it takes to
repair the damages--when in truth nothing of the sort
is true. With these considerations in mind, the truth
of the following claim seems evident: if X's giving
A to Y is what it takes for X to settle X's debt to Y,
then in giving A to Y, X is thereby settling X's debt
to Y and, moreover, X implies (at least) implicitly
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that it is not for some other purpose that X gives A to
Y.
Applying these remarks to affInnative action,
my position quite simply is that because blacks have
been the victim of racism they have been wronged--
egregiously wronged in many instances. On account
of racism, academic institutions all across America
have in the past either restricted the admission of
blacks or refused blacks admission entirely. I take it
to be clear that this constituted a wrong and,
therefore, that there is a debt--a moral debt, if you
will--to blacks which needs to be settled; for in
general to wrong a person is to put oneself in moral
debt to that person. For American academic
institutions not to acknowledge this debt by, in this
case, attempting to settle it is, Icontend, an affront to
the self-respect of blacks, just as my not
acknowledging my debt to you on account of the
damage that I did to your car would be affront to
you. To acknowledge the wrong that one has done
to a person makes it clear to that individual that one
believes there to be limits on how morally one ought
to treat a person. And this, needless to say, is
extremely important.
Two objections to affinnative action come
readily to mind. One is that slavery and racism
constitute a past rather than a present wrong; and
whites today should not be held accountable for the
wrongs of their ancestors. Another is that often
enough the black who benefits from affirmative
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action turns out to need it the least. I deal with these
objections in the section which follows.
II
The first objection--namely that slavery and
racism are past wrongs--really speaks to the issue of
justice across generations. It assumes that these
wrongs are rather self-contained; and it is mistaken
in this assumption. One result of past racism is that
it gave rise to deep stereotypes concerning blacks--
stereotypes under which present blacks now labor.
And stereotypes profoundly influence the way we
interact with one another. To illustrate consider the
so-called innocent Polish joke: "How many Poles
does it take to do such-and-such? Three to do this
and four to do something else." The humor of
Polish jokes trades upon the stereotype that Poles are
stupid. Thus, observe that Polish jokes are rarely, if
ever funny, when Jews are substituted for Poles.
The explanation for this is hardly mysterious. While
the stereotype of the Jew has it that Jews are
parsimonious or conniving or have an otherwise
shady character, the stereotype of the Jew is not that
of a person who is stupid. So-called innocent Polish
jokes have as their background assumption that those
who are the butt of the joke are stupid; and Jews are
not that--so the stereotype has it.
Slavery and racism have their legacy of
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negative stereotypes concerning blacks. They are
shiftless and stupid; they dance well and love sex;
and, in particular, they are not capable of rigorous
intellectual thought. Never mind that there are
thousands upon thousands of whites who are rather
inept intellectually, whites as such do not labor under
the stereotype of being intellectually incapable.
Now, this stereotype does not attach itself only to
blacks who are in fact poor and not much given to
rigorous intellectual thought, it attaches itself to all
blacks, period. It creates a presumption under which
all blacks labor. Now, to be sure, there are blacks in
this world who rebut this presumption the minute
they open their mouths. But the fact that some
blacks are masterfully able to rebut this presumption
does not show that the stereotype passes over them.
After all, being a gifted black is not something that
one can just see from afar.
Having to labor under negative stereotypes
readily deals with the problem of justice across
generations, as we have a present harm (the negative
stereotypes) owing to past wrongs (slavery and
racism). I take it as a given that blacks--whether
dumb or smart, rich or poor--should not have to
labor under the negative stereotypes that have
resulted from past injustices. The moral debt that
white America must settle has to do with eradicating
the negative stereotypes that its past unjust actions
have given rise to. In short, therein lies the
justification for affmnative action.
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Before moving on, let me underscore the point
about stereotypes in another way. In America, to
speak with an English accent is to secure all thirty-six
inches on the social yardstick--expecially among
academicians. It just sounds more charming or more
witty or more incisive or whatever when said with an
English accent. Observe that foreigners who have
lived in this country for years often maintain their
accent, whereas Americans who return to the United
states after having spent only a few years in England
manage to pick up an English accent--which
somehow sticks. Allowing for the moment that
osmosis suffices to account for why an American in
England picks up an English accent when in
England, I often wonder why osmosis seems not to
work upon the return to America. The moral of this
amusing aside is this. Stereotypes range over nearly
every aspect of a person's non-verbal behavior:
from his speech pattern and tone of voice to his gait
and style of clothes. And the very point of
observation about the English accent is that the very
way in which one hears something can have more to
do with the accent with which a person speaks than
the content of his remarks. If an English accent can
make the sort of difference I have mentioned, where
there is no built in presumption that the English are
more intelligent than Americans (certainly none that
amounts to much), then it has to be absurd for
anyone to think that the negative stereotype of blacks
does not influence their thinking and receptivity
»»»»»»»»»»»»»»»»»»9
towards blacks.
Now, one might agree that the negative
stereotypes which prevail concerning blacks should
be eliminated and still maintain that the practice of
affirmative action is unfair to whites. Let me deal
with this difficulty specifically.
III
Suppose two people, X and Y, apply for the
one and only chemistry position at Small College.
Suppose further that when it comes to academic
abilities, publication potential, collegiality, and
teaching skills, X and Y are extremely good and
equally qualified. However, X is an excellent piano
player and Y is an excellent soccer player. Now, it
just so happens that the piano player for Small
College's choir has resigned, and Small College is
anxious to get a new piano player. But this is a
voluntary position, you see, since Small College
simply cannot afford to pay anyone for the position.
Now, I ask you: Does Small College do what is
morally wrong if, in virtue of its concern to have a
piano player for the choir, it hires X, it being
understood that X would be delighted to play for the
choir? Does justice require that a coin be flipped in
this situation?
Keeping this question in mind, imagine an
analogous situation. Suppose two people, B (a
black) and W (a white) apply for the one and only
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philosophy position at Small College. Suppose
further that when it comes to academic abilities,
publication potential, collegiality, and teaching skills,
Band W are extremely good and equally qualified.
As one might gather, because B is so talented (as
talented as W), he would playa most significant role
in rebutting the negative presumptions regarding the
intellectual abilities of blacks which might prevail at
Small College. Does Small College do what is
morally wrong if, in virtue of its concern to rebut the
negative presumption regarding blacks, it hires B
over Y? Does justice require that a coin be flipped in
this situation?
At this point, one might be tempted to maintain
that the two situations are not analogous, since being
a piano player is an acquired skill, whereas being
black or white surely is not. To my mind, this is to
cavil mightily. For suppose that in my fust story
what Small College needs is a midget for their annual
play to raise money, and X is exactly that. Well,
needless to say, height is not an acquired skill; it is
more like being black than being a piano player.
I assume, then, that the stories are exactly
parallel and, therefore, that Small College does no
wrong in hiring X over Y if, and only, if it does no
wrong in hiring B over W. And I maintain that it
does no wrong in the former instance.
To begin with, it should be noted that neither X
nor Y (and so neither B nor W) have a right to the
job. And it will be remembered that only one would
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get the job. What each has a right to is that his
credentials be fairly considered by Small College.
What this amounts to is a right not to be ruled out of
the job competition on grounds that have to do with
an improper weighting of one's credentials. This is
not a right which precludes any introduction of
considerations which are not tied to the position;
though, to be sure, the introduction of such
considerations is precluded just so long as
considerations which pertain to the job are met by
one or more of the candidates. Small College should
not hire X over Y, however well X plays, if X is
unqualified to teach chemistry. If these
considerations are sound, then it is a mistake to
suppose that in the choice betwen either X and Y or
Band W, justice requires that Small College flip a
coin. Specifically, the hiring of X and B for the
reasons mentioned cannot in any way be construed
as ruling out either Y or W for reasons having to do
with an improper weighting of credentials.
Since by hypothesis, the two sets of candidates
are tied with respect to their professional credentials,
it follows that the tie can be broken only by
introducing a non-professional consideration.
Flipping a coin is certainly such a consideration.
However, there is no reason to suppose that this is
the only non-professional consideration which, if
introduced would be fair. If, in the case of Band W,
anyone is inclined to think that for the reasons
mentioned the hiring of B over W amounts to no
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more than racism in reverse she should think again.
For the racism which has so tainted American history
did not amount to the practice of simply hiring whites
over blacks in the case of ties. Rather, the racism of
this country meant that in a great many instances to
be black was to be automatically unqualified for the
job. It was to be summarily dismissed. The case of
hiring B over W does not even come close to being a
reverse of this practice.
So far, my argument has been that Small
College does nothing morally objectionable in hiring
B over W. But I want to say that Small College
morally ought to hire B. If it is morally permissible
for Small College to hire X over Y, then, even more
so, it must be morally permissible for Small College
to hire B over W. Indeed, it is not just a good thing
that Small College take steps to correct the negative
stereotypes of blacks which academic institutions
have fostered by their past discriminatory practices
against blacks, they owe this much to blacks. There
is a wrong which should be made right. B should be
hired over W precisely because Small College owes
it to blacks to correct the negative presumption which
has been fostered with respect to blacks. Notice, it
does not matter at all whether B is actually from a
low socio-economic class or is well-off. The hiring
of a well-off black is no embarrassment to the
argument at all, since they, too, must bear up under
the negative stereotypes; and, for all we know, they
may be the most effective at eradicating the negative
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stereotypes of blacks that prevail.
Let me now bring out the way in which the
account of affIrmative action offered is institutionally-
relative, as I shall say. To begin with, we must
distinquish between (1) the quality of candidate an
institution would like to hire and (2) the quality of
candidate an institution is prepared to settle for.
Quite often (2) is less than (1). For I take it that most
institutions would like to hire the very best candidate
on the job market each year. But, of course, as a
matter of logic alone, not every institution can do
that, as not everyone can hire the very best person
among all available job candidates in any given year.
Accordingly, some settle for less than the best person
without feeling that they in any way jeopardize their
standards. When adjusted to institutions, my
position is this: An institution must hire a minority
candidate if the minority is as qualifIed as a white
candidate for whom the institution is prepared to
settle. These remarks render the account of
affrrmatiave action offered institutionally-relative.
Whether or not a minority is good enough to be hired
by a given institution is tied to the quality of the
white candidate for whom the institution is prepared
to settle. The black candidate must be at least as
good as that candidate. Some institutions are
prepared to hire a candidate only if he will rank
among the very top in his profession. Institutions
such as these should not have to settle for a black
who does not measure up in this regard. But
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needless to say, it is not the case that every insitution
is prepared to hire a candidate only if he will rank
among the very top in his profession. For if this
were true, there would be very little hiring going on.
In terms of whom they can get, most institutions
lower their sights. They know that they will not be
able to attract the very best candidates, barring some
special story such as the candidate's spouse must
move to the area. Barring an explanation such as
this, a small college in North Dakota can be
reasonably certain that it cannot compete against the
ivy league schools. So, if this college plans to do
any hiring at all, it must be willing to settle for less,
which is not to say that it must be willing to settle for
anything. And my position is that this small college
in North Dakota must hire the black applicant who is
as good as the white applicant it can get and for
whom it is prepared to settle, though neither the
black nor the white ranks among the very best
candidates.
IV
Offhand, my defense of affirmative action
would seem to be ever so limited, since it explicitly
pertains ony to acdemic institutions. I suggest,
however, that it is not as limited as one might
suppose. The idea that the negative stereotypes,
owing to slavery and racism, should be eliminated
plays a central role in my argument; and we know
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that these stereotypes of blacks pervade every aspect
of American life. It is no accident that this is so.
From the Jim Crow laws of the south to the defacto
racism in the north, America has regarded blacks as
second-class citizens in all walks of life. The idea
that blacks are morally, intellectually, and socially
inferior has been played out in virtually every crevice
of the American society. It is hard to imagine an
aspect of society which has not had a hand in doing
so. This not to claim that everyone has set out to act
in ways which convey this attitude of blacks, but that
nearly everyone--including, in some instances,
blacks themselves--have unwittingly participated in
patterns of behavior which perpetuate the negative
stereotypes of society. If so, then the arguments of
this essay are more far reaching than one might have
suspected.
Conspicuously absent in my defense of
affirmative action is any reference to the role-model
argument. Let me say a word about this argument.
Briefly, this argument has it that a consideration
which very much militates mightily in favor of
affIrmative aciton is that black students need black
role-models: that is, if black students are to see
themselves as being capable of succeeding as blacks,
they need to see successful blacks. The main
problem that I have with the argument is that it comes
dangerously close to being in keeping with a racist
view of blacks. For if in order to succeed blacks
need black role-models, then it follows that the black
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who should manage to succeed in the absence of any
such role-model proves to be an exception. Thus,
the argument comes too close for comfort to
suggesting that blacks are not able to make it on their
own. And this is what racists have been saying all
along.
While I do not want to deny the importance of
black role-models, I should like to minimize the
extent to which the idea is relied upon in arguments
for affirmative aciton at least in regards to blacks.
Black people are not the problem but white people
who, unwittingly or otherwise, refuse to take black
people seriously. Because of the misconceptions
brought on by negative stereotypes, which in virtue
of living in America it is very hard not to be
influenced by, many well-meaning whites fail to take
blacks seriously. I want to down play the
significance which the role-model argument plays in
affirmative action because I want to make more
perspicuous the reality that affirmative action is
needed, not because blacks have trouble measuring
up, but because America, being caught in the grip of
the very stereotypes about blacks which it created,
has enormous difficulty acknowledging the fact that
blacks can measure up, notwithstanding the good
intentions of the very many who indeed care. Good
intentions, alas, do not make one immune to the
influence of stereotypes; and this truth needs to be
appreciated. I take affirmative action to be the
settling of a moral debt and that it can not be -- so it
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seems to me--if its raison d'etre is that blacks need
role-models. After all, good role-models are
important for everyone, not just those who have been
victims of oppression. I reject the implication that
things might be otherwise--an implication which the
role-model argument would seem to invite. *
* A version of this essay was originally
presented at Southwestern University in
(Georgetown) Texas, where Susan Wolf was a most
thoughtful and gracious commentator; it has since
been presented at the University of Nebraska. The
present version was written during a research leave at
Oberlin College 1987-88.
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